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Abstract
Religious disagreements are widespread. Some philosophers have argued that religious disagreements call for religious skep-
ticism, or a revision of one’s religious beliefs. In order to figure out the epistemic significance of religious disagreements, 
two questions need to be answered. First, what kind of disagreements are religious disagreements? Second, how should one 
respond to such disagreements? In this paper, I argue that many religious disagreements are cases of unconfirmed superiority 
disagreements, where parties have good reason to think they are not epistemic peers, yet they lack good reason to determine 
who is superior. Such disagreements have been left relatively unexplored. I then argue that in cases of unconfirmed superi-
ority disagreements, disputants can remain relatively steadfast in holding to their beliefs. Hence, we can remain relatively 
steadfast in our beliefs in such cases of religious disagreements.
Keywords Religious disagreement · Epistemology of disagreement · Peer disagreement · Peerhood
1 Introduction
Religious disagreements are widespread. Some philosophers 
have argued that religious disagreements call for religious 
skepticism, or a revision of one’s religious beliefs.1 Others 
have argued against such skeptical arguments.2 In order to 
figure out the epistemic significance of religious disagree-
ments, two questions need to be answered. First, what kind 
of disagreements are religious disagreements? Second, how 
should one respond to such disagreements?
Three main positions have been taken in the literature 
to address the first question. The first position holds that 
religious disagreements are peer disagreements, where par-
ties have good reason to take each other as epistemic peers.3 
Philosophers holding this position either argue that peer 
disagreement requires some amount of skepticism or argue 
that we should remain steadfast in our beliefs. The second 
position holds that in religious disagreements, parties are 
justified in taking themselves as superiors.4 In such a case, 
parties can remain steadfast in their beliefs. The third posi-
tion holds that religious disagreements are unconfirmed peer 
disagreements, where there is no good reason to take dispu-
tants as an epistemic peer, inferior or superior, but there is 
no good reason to dismiss disputants as peers either.5 As in 
cases of peer disagreement, philosophers who take up this 
position differ in whether such disagreement requires revi-
sion of our beliefs.
In this paper, I argue for a fourth position. I argue that 
many religious disagreements are cases of unconfirmed 
superiority disagreements, where parties have good reason 
to think they are not epistemic peers, yet they lack good rea-
son to determine who is superior. This differs from uncon-
firmed peer disagreements in that disputants have reason to 
think they are not peers. This I hope opens up discussion of 
how we should respond to such cases of disagreements. I 
then set out my own position: in cases of unconfirmed supe-
riority, disputants can remain relatively steadfast in holding 
to their beliefs. Hence, we can remain relatively steadfast in 
our beliefs in such cases of religious disagreements.
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1 See for example Feldman (2007), Kraft (2012) and Matheson 
(2017).
2 See for example Bergmann (2015), Bogardus (2013), DePoe 
(2011), Pittard (2014) and King (2012).
3 See for example Frances (2015), Kraft (2012), Lackey (2014) and 
Matheson (2017).
4 See for example Bergmann (2015), Bogardus (2013), DePoe 
(2011), Oppy (2010) and Pittard (2014).
5 See for example Sherman (2015) and arguably Feldman (2007).
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In Sect. 2, I clarify the idea of epistemic peerhood I am 
working with. I argue that we should understand peerhood 
in terms of being equal in one’s total epistemic position. In 
Sect. 3, I lay out two main standards to evaluate peerhood. 
In Sect. 4, I apply the two standards to religious disagree-
ments. I argue that many religious disagreements are cases 
of unconfirmed superiority disagreements. In Sect. 5, I con-
sider two views on the epistemic significance of unconfirmed 
peer disagreements. In Sect. 6, I draw from the discussion 
in Sect. 5 and argue that disputants can remain relatively 
steadfast in holding to their belief in cases of unconfirmed 
superiority.
2  The Idea of Epistemic Peerhood
Most of the literature on the epistemology of disagreement 
focuses on peer disagreement (Gelfert 2011). Peer disa-
greement occurs when one faces a disagreement with a dis-
putant whom one has good reason to take as an epistemic 
peer.6 Some think that one should suspend belief in such 
cases.7 Others think one should assign equal weight to both 
views and conciliate.8 Still, others think that one can remain 
steadfast in one’s belief when certain conditions are satisfied 
(such as having an error theory about the opposing position 
or having high antecedent justification for one’s belief).9 
These views all rely on the idea of epistemic peerhood. 
There are many conceptions and definitions of epistemic 
peerhood. In this section, I will argue that we should under-
stand peerhood in terms of one’s total epistemic position.
Roughly, two things are important when it comes to one’s 
total epistemic position. The first has to do with evidential 
possession and the second has to do with evidential pro-
cessing.10 Regarding the first, what is relevant is what evi-
dence one possesses. Regarding the second, what is relevant 
would be methodologies, epistemic virtues and epistemic 
ability. When it comes to peerhood, some thinkers hold that 
epistemic peers are those who both possess the same evi-
dence and process evidence the same way. Catherine Elgin 
for example says that epistemic peers must have the “same 
evidence, reasoning abilities, training, and background 
assumptions” (2010, p. 53). Sameness is important. Other 
thinkers however think sameness is not necessary. Instead, 
what is important is equality. For example, when Thomas 
Kelly talks about epistemic peerhood, he says “two indi-
viduals are epistemic peers with respect to some question 
if and only if they satisfy the following two conditions: (i) 
they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the 
evidence and arguments which bear on that question, and 
(ii) they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues 
such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias” 
(2005, pp. 174–175). Jonathan Matheson supports this idea 
as he points out that one can achieve equality in evidential 
possession by “having distinct, but equally good, bodies of 
evidence” (2015, p. 22). One can also achieve equality in 
evidential processing as long as “the likelihood of their pro-
cessing the evidence correctly is equally high,” even if they 
process the evidence differently (2015, p. 22). For example, 
people who use different methods to solve a math sum can be 
epistemic peers if the methods are equally reliable. Mathe-
son further thinks that one may make up for lack of evidence 
by being better at processing evidence, or vice versa, making 
both parties equally likely to be right (2015, p. 23). What is 
important for these thinkers is equality instead of sameness.
I think that we should take epistemic peers as those who 
are equal in their total epistemic positions.11 This is because 
such an understanding of peerhood seems to be the driving 
force behind the different principles and arguments in the 
literature. For example, conciliationists think that one should 
give equal weight to one’s disputant in cases where both pos-
sess the same evidence and same dispositions because hav-
ing the same evidence and dispositions makes both equally 
likely to be correct in that scenario.12 The intuition many 
conciliationists seem to have is that I should give my dispu-
tant’s view equal weight if I take the disputant to be in an 
equal epistemic position, since both of us are as likely to be 
right.13 Hence, we should take epistemic peers as those who 
are equal in their total epistemic positions.
6 Some take peer disagreement to be cases where disputants are in 
actual fact peers, or cases where one takes the other to be a peer, or 
cases where one justifiably takes one as a peer. I take peer disagree-
ment to be cases in which one has reason to take the other party as a 
peer.
7 See for example Feldman (2007).
8 See for example Christensen (2011), Elga (2007), Matheson (2017).
9 See for example Bergmann (2009, 2015), Kelly (2005), Lackey 
(2010).
10 See for example Kelly (2005, pp.  174–175), Matheson (2015, 
p. 22), King (2012, p. 252).
11 To note, there may also be circumstantial factors that causes one 
not to assess the evidence reliably in a particular dispute. For exam-
ple, one may be overly tired on a particular occasion when weigh-
ing the evidence. Hence, what is required is being in equal epistemic 
positions in the particular dispute, and not just merely generally 
(Matheson 2015, p. 23).
12 See for example Christensen (2011), Elga (2007), Matheson 
(2015).
13 Elga (2007) takes peer disagreement to occur when both parties 
are equally likely to be right in the particular occasion.
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3  Assessing Peerhood
With this idea of peerhood, we need to ask when one has 
good reason to take a disputant as a peer or not. This is 
because some philosophers have pointed out that in many 
actual cases of disagreement, we may lack good reason to 
take others as epistemic peers.14 If we lack good reason to 
take others as epistemic peers, then the principles and argu-
ments in the literature—which in general simply stipulate 
peerhood and focus on examining its epistemic implica-
tions—lose much of their relevance. Given this, what I think 
has not been adequately discussed is how we should assess 
whether someone is a peer (or not a peer). Below, I examine 
two main ways of doing so.
The first standard of assessment is based on wide-ranging 
agreement and disagreement with one’s disputant in regards 
to the disputed proposition. Adam Elga’s idea is that if we 
disagree on a wide-ranging number of issues, then we have 
good reason to think we are not peers (2007, pp. 492–496). 
Elga raises an example as follows. If Ann and Beth disagree 
on whether abortion is permissible, they may have further 
discussed “whether human beings have souls, whether it is 
permissible to withhold treatment from certain terminally ill 
infants, and whether rights figure prominently in a correct 
ethical theory” (Elga 2007, p. 493) If they disagree on all 
these issues, Ann will have good reason to think Beth is not 
a peer when it comes to abortion, even if Beth seems “as 
thoughtful, well-informed, quick-witted, and so on” (Elga 
2007, p. 493) So Elga’s idea is that wide-ranging disagree-
ment with one’s disputant in regards to the disputed proposi-
tion gives one good reason not to take the disputant as a peer.
If wide-ranging disagreement gives us reason to dismiss 
a disputant as a peer, how about wide-ranging agreement? 
I suggest that we have good reason to think one’s disputant 
is at least a peer if the disputant largely agrees with you 
regarding other propositions in the related field (or regard-
ing other relevant propositions).15 For example, suppose my 
friend and I disagree on a math question on a test. We then 
compare all the other answers to other math questions we 
have done on the test and they are the same. It seems that 
the wide-ranging agreement with my friend gives me good 
reason to think he is at least equally likely to be right regard-
ing the disputed question.
Going back to Elga’s case, what happens if there is wide-
ranging disagreement? I do think that Elga is right in saying 
that wide-ranging disagreement gives one good reason to 
dismiss a disputant as a peer. However, Elga further thinks 
that this justifies a person in taking oneself as epistemically 
superior (2007, p. 493). Contra Elga, I think wide-ranging 
disagreement does not give one good reason to take one-
self as epistemically superior (or inferior for that matter). 
Suppose my math teacher marks my paper and disagrees 
with many of my answers. Surely, this provides no reason 
to think she is epistemically inferior. Hence, wide-ranging 
disagreement only provides some reason to doubt that one’s 
disputant is a peer but not give us reason to take ourselves 
as epistemically superior.
A second standard of assessment is based on the relevant 
credibility-conferring features (i.e. evidential possession 
and processing).16 First, one must ask what the relevant 
credibility-conferring features are in regard to the disputed 
case. For example, in regards to evidential possession, one 
might ask what is considered relevant evidence to the dis-
pute. In regards to evidential processing, one may ask what 
dispositions or virtues would make one reliable in this case. 
One might also have an error theory to dismiss a disputant’s 
evidence as misleading or unreliable, or to think that one has 
processed the evidence unreliably.17 Second, one must be 
able to compare oneself with one’s disputant in terms of both 
evidential possession and processing. If a disputant’s overall 
set of the relevant credibility-conferring features is equally 
good as one’s own set, then one should take a disputant as a 
peer. The advantage of this method of assessing peerhood is 
that even if one is not a peer, we can still determine whether 
we should take a disputant as epistemically superior or infe-
rior, and to what extent. For example, if someone’s overall 
set is only slightly inferior to mine, then I should still assign 
some degree of trust to him. If someone’s overall set is much 
more inferior, then I might assign very little trust or even 
none.
Regarding the second standard of assessment, some wor-
ries may arise. In many cases, it may be hard to answer 
exactly what credibility-conferring features are relevant. 
Another difficulty is in making the comparison with one’s 
disputant. Often, it is hard to judge whether one’s dispu-
tants have these credibility-conferring features and to what 
extent. It may also be hard to judge oneself objectively. For 
example, it is difficult to assess how careful our disputant is 
compared to us when answering a mathematical question.
A way to overcome these difficulties is to look at one’s 
track record, where a track record may consist of various 
things like testimony, institutional certification, having been 
right in previous disagreements, and so forth. This may tell 
14 See for example King (2012), Elga (2007, p.  492) and Lackey 
(2010, pp. 311–312).
15 To note, the disputant’s agreement must be independent of your 
assessment.
16 This term comes from Sherman (2015, p. 427).
17 An error theory is a theory one has about why others are in error. 
For example, if I meet someone who is drinking a lot of alcohol and 
disagrees with me on an intellectual issue, I have an error theory, 
namely that the alcohol he drinks causes cognitive malfunction.
1142 F. Choo 
1 3
us if our disputant has the relevant credibility-conferring 
features without having to identify and assess the specific 
features. To illustrate, suppose a stranger and I disagree on 
a math question. We both take out our school results and 
find that both of us have gotten an A on our past few math 
exams. His track record gives me reason to take him as a 
peer even though I cannot directly know specifics such as 
how careful he is when doing math problems or how many 
math textbooks he has read. I do not need to identify the list 
of evidence and dispositions followed by attempting to make 
a comparison. I can just assess him using his track record.
The two standards of assessments above can each provide 
reasons for taking someone as a peer, or dismissing someone 
as a peer. Thus, even if I cannot assess a disputant’s track 
record or his credibility-conferring features directly, I may 
know that we disagree on a wide-ranging set of issues related 
to the disputed proposition. So the first standard gives me 
reason to take him as a non-peer. Likewise, there may be 
times where the first standard of assessment is unavailable 
and the second standard can be used. One may worry that at 
times they could conflict. For example, a disputant may have 
an equally good track record as you and even seem to share 
the same credibility-conferring features. However, both of 
you disagree on a wide-ranging number of issues. Hence, the 
second standard gives you a reason to take them as a peer 
while the first standard gives you reason to dismiss them as a 
peer. The issue of how we should balance the standards is an 
interesting question; this however would have to be another 
topic for another paper. For now, it would suffice to say that 
both standards can each provide reasons for taking one as a 
peer or dismissing one as a peer.
4  What Kind of Disagreements are Religious 
Disagreements?
With these two standards of determining if one is a peer, we 
can now apply them to religious disagreements. To recall, 
there are three main positions that have been taken in the lit-
erature. The first position holds that religious disagreements 
are peer disagreements.18 The second holds that in religious 
disagreements, parties are justified in taking themselves as 
superior.19 The third holds that religious disagreements are 
unconfirmed peer disagreements, where there is no good 
reason to take disputants as epistemic peers, inferiors or 
superiors, but there is also no good reason to think dispu-
tants are not peers either.20
In this section, I will argue that many religious disagree-
ments are instead best understood as cases of unconfirmed 
superiority disagreement. Such a case is similar to uncon-
firmed peer disagreements, where parties lack good reason 
to take disputants as an epistemic peer, inferior, or superior. 
However, the difference is that in unconfirmed superiority 
disagreements, there is good reason to think one’s disputant 
is not a peer. In unconfirmed superiority disagreements, one 
party is superior, though disputants lack good reason indicat-
ing who it is.
The cases of religious disagreements I have in mind are 
of three types:
(A) Disagreements about God’s existence (between theists 
and atheists).
(B) Disagreement about which religion is right (between 
religions).
(C) Disagreement about religious propositions within one’s 
own religion.
There are of course other types of religious disagree-
ments, such as a disagreement between an agnostic and an 
atheist for example. I will however only focus on the three 
types of religious disagreements above. Also, in arguing that 
many of these types of disagreements are cases of uncon-
firmed superiority, I do not mean to say that all disagree-
ments of the above types are cases of unconfirmed superi-
ority. Within these three types of religious disagreements, 
there are surely cases which are not unconfirmed superiority 
disagreements and a different response might be called for 
in those cases.
Let’s start with the first standard of assessing peerhood 
based on wide-ranging agreement and disagreement with 
one’s disputant. First, consider (A). Between a theist and 
atheist, they will not only disagree on whether God exists, 
but on whether heaven exists, whether we should pray, and 
so forth. There are few religious propositions that I think the 
theist and atheist would likely agree upon.21 Next, consider 
(B). Between (for instance) Christian theists and Muslim 
theists, they will disagree on whether Jesus is God, whether 
God is a Trinity, whether the Bible has been corrupted, 
conditions for salvation and so forth. Even for (C), there is 
often wide-ranging disagreement. For example, two Chris-
tian theologians who disagree on whether we have libertar-
ian freewill might disagree on the doctrine of original sin, 
whether Christ only died for the elect, the extent and effect 
20 See for example Sherman (2015) and arguably Feldman (2007).
21 They might for example agree on propositions with a logical dis-
junction such as <either God exists or God does not exist>.
18 See for example Frances (2015), Kraft (2012), Lackey (2014) and 
Matheson (2017).
19 See for example Bergmann (2015), Bogardus (2013), DePoe 
(2011), Oppy (2010) and Pittard (2014).
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of God’s grace, and so forth.22 The wide-ranging disagree-
ment described above seems plentiful, though more promi-
nent in (A) and (B) and less so in (C). Hence, it seems that in 
many cases of religious disagreements, there is wide-ranging 
disagreement with one’s disputant regarding many religious 
propositions. This means that one has reason to doubt that 
one’s disputants are peers in such cases. The wide-ranging 
disagreement shows that both parties are in different epis-
temic positions. To further note, as argued above, this does 
not provide justification for any party to take themselves as 
epistemically superior. So the first standard of assessment 
provides some reason to think that many cases of religious 
disagreements are unconfirmed superiority disagreements.
We may next move to the second standard to assess peer-
hood. Here, we must first answer what the relevant cred-
ibility-conferring features are when it comes to religious 
propositions. This however is problematic in religious disa-
greements because disputants disagree on what the relevant 
credibility-conferring features are. This is easily seen in 
the diversity of justifications religious people give for their 
beliefs. Some may say that what is relevant is argumentation, 
usually in terms of philosophical or scientific arguments. 
Others may say that one must be devoted to exercising the 
appropriate meditation techniques. Others say that faith is 
required to see religious truths. Others say that religious 
experiences or special Divine revelation is required. So there 
is disagreement on what the relevant credibility-conferring 
features are when it comes to assessing religious propo-
sitions. Though not as prevalent, this is sometimes even 
debated within one’s own religion. For example, Christian 
philosophers and theologians debate on the role of faith and 
reason, on the role of the Holy Spirit, on the use of natu-
ral theology, and so on.23 Buddhists may disagree on what 
exactly are the appropriate meditation techniques. Given 
the disagreements, one cannot just assume that the set of 
credibility-conferring features one holds to is the right one. 
Call this the diversity problem. This problem I think plagues 
both (A) and (B) significantly, and (C) in some cases.24
Next, there is also a circularity problem. Can one jus-
tify which set of credibility-conferring features is relevant 
without circularity? First, in many cases, one holds to a cer-
tain set of credibility-conferring features only because one 
already holds one’s own religious position. For example, 
Buddhists believe that meditation is necessary to be able 
to see the truths in the Buddhist teachings. However, they 
believe this only because they already believe those Buddhist 
teachings in the first place.
Second, the relevant set of credibility-conferring features 
is dependent on which view is correct. Consider the issue of 
God’s existence. Alvin Plantinga for example argues that if 
the Christian God exists, then there probably is a faculty that 
helps us form belief in God under certain circumstances by 
giving us theistic experiences (2015, pp. 45–56).25 So if God 
exists, then theistic experiences are relevant evidence. Belief 
in God can be properly basic and not inferred from other 
propositions. John Pittard further adds that many religious 
believers could easily read 1 Corinthians 1:18–29 to say 
“that the possession of wisdom, or at least the possession of 
wisdom as it is conventionally understood, does not reliably 
help someone to arrive at the truth regarding God” (2014, 
pp. 87–91). So if the Christian God exists, philosophical and 
scientific arguments may be considered irrelevant credibil-
ity-conferring features and theistic experiences are highly 
relevant instead. This view is held by many lay religious 
believers. Now if such a God does not exist, then another set 
of credibility-conferring features would be relevant instead. 
Philosophical and scientific arguments may be considered 
as highly important while theistic experiences would just be 
misleading evidence. Hence, which set of credibility-confer-
ring features is relevant depends on which view is correct. 
This creates a circularity problem. In order to determine 
what one should believe about God’s existence, one must 
assess what the relevant credibility-conferring features are, 
but one can only do so depending on whether God exists.
Despite these problems, some philosophers argue that 
parties can take themselves as epistemically superior in 
terms of credibility-conferring features. John DePoe for 
example says that religious believers may each think that 
their evidence is better than the other’s. He says, “Due to 
the private nature of religious experiences (and their coun-
terfeits), we are not able to compare the evidential quality 
of different supposed religious experiences” (2011, p. 105). 
Here, I think DePoe makes a jump. He seems to think that 
if one cannot compare evidence, then one can take one’s 
own evidence as superior. But why think so? If we cannot 
make a comparison, then we cannot say if one is superior 
to the other.
Other philosophers have instead tried to find other rea-
sons to downgrade disputants through error theories. For 
example, theists may think that atheists are blinded by sin 
22 This can be seen in the Calvinism versus Arminianism theological 
debate.
23 Moser (2010, pp.  142–184) for example rejects natural theology 
outright, thinking that natural theology provides evidence that is 
impersonal which is not what we should expect from God.
24 One reviewer has pointed out that this may further give us reason 
to dismiss the other party as a peer. The fact that both parties appeal 
to epistemic methods or standards which the other party find unac-
ceptable seems to hint that they are not peers in regards to the issue 
at hand.
25 To be precise, Plantinga thinks that the faculty is damaged by sin 
but under certain conditions, such as the Holy Spirit working in a per-
son, the faculty will function properly.
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(Plantinga 2015, pp. 43–44), or just lack religious experience 
(Frances 2015, p. 187; Bergmann 2015, p. 48), or they fear 
submission to a higher authority.26 Atheists may think that 
theists suffer from various epistemic weaknesses like social 
pressures or wishful thinking (Frances 2015, p. 187; Russell 
2017). An example of these competing error theories can be 
found in Bruce Russell’s review of Paul Moser’s The Elu-
sive God. Russell (2017) says “[Moser] sees evidence and 
good God-invoking explanations of religious experiences 
where I see none. No doubt he will attribute this to my spir-
itual blindness, and that, ultimately, to my selfishness and 
pridefulness. Of course, I think that his views about theistic 
evidence and explanation rest on wishful thinking.”
I think that the error theories in many cases do not give 
one good reason to take oneself as epistemically superior. 
The problem is that these error theories suffer from both 
the diversity problem and the circularity problem described 
above. For example, a Christian may believe that an atheist 
is spiritually blinded by sin because she believes the Bible 
teaches this. Furthermore, error theories apply not just to 
the first-order issue of disagreement but also to the other 
side’s error theories. For example, a theist may say that the 
reason why an atheist holds an error theory against religious 
believers is the result of the atheist being blinded by sin. The 
atheist will likewise have an error theoretic explanation of 
the theist’s error theory, and so forth. The upshot of this is 
that error theories seem to ultimately go nowhere as a way 
of determining epistemic superiority.
Everything said in this section likewise applies, muta-
tis mutandis, to disagreements between religions. As with 
disagreements between theists and atheists, disagreements 
between adherents of different religions appeal to differ-
ent religious epistemological views and error theories. For 
example, the Quran (17, pp. 45–46) seems to talk about 
Allah blinding unbelievers. Buddhists may likewise claim 
that non-Buddhists lack proper meditation techniques and 
hence their minds cannot grasp the ultimate truths of the 
world.27 To sum up, there is difficulty determining what 
the relevant credibility-conferring features are in cases of 
disagreement.
What can however be seen is that parties often differ 
greatly in evidential possession and processing. These asym-
metries give us some reason to think that parties are in dif-
ferent epistemic positions. Take for example the following 
simple model. Suppose Jane is a typical religious believer 
with religious experiences but no philosophical training. 
Meanwhile, Ken is an atheistic philosopher with no religious 
experiences. Both claim epistemic superiority because they 
differ on what they think the relevant credibility-conferring 
features are. If Jane is right about the relevant credibility-
conferring features, they are not peers. If Ken is right about 
the relevant credibility-conferring features, they are not 
peers. Either way, they are not peers. So regardless of who is 
right about the relevant credibility-conferring features, both 
can agree that they are not in equal epistemic positions in 
either case. Hence, based on the second standard of assess-
ment, there is reason to think that disputants in religious 
disagreements are not equal in epistemic positions.
What can be learnt from the two standards of assess-
ment is that parties in religious disagreements often have 
good reason to think that one’s disputant is not a peer. Both 
standards give parties good reasons to dismiss each other 
as a peer. While parties have good reason to believe that 
they are in different epistemic positions, it is questionable 
who is in a better epistemic position. Hence, many religious 
disagreements are not cases of peer disagreement. Nor are 
they cases where one can justifiably dismiss one’s disputant 
as epistemically inferior. Nor are they cases of unconfirmed 
peer disagreement since parties have good reason to think 
they are not peers. Such religious disagreements are uncon-
firmed superiority disagreements.
5  Unconfirmed Peer Disagreements
Before moving to unconfirmed superiority disagreements, 
it will be helpful to consider some of the major views in the 
literature on unconfirmed peer disagreements—disagree-
ments where one lacks good reason to determine whether a 
disputant is a peer. Ben Sherman lays out two main camps 
on the epistemic significance of such disagreement.
Those in the first camp say that we should remain stead-
fast. Sherman calls the first view as “The Presumption in 
Favor of Self-Trust: we should trust our own judgment unless 
we have reason to think others’ judgment is as good or bet-
ter” (2015, p. 430). There are at least two possible views that 
fall into this camp.
SF1 In cases of unconfirmed peer disagreement, we should 
not take ourselves as epistemically superior, inferior or as 
peers, and we should just remain steadfast.
SF2 In cases of unconfirmed peer disagreement, we should 
just take ourselves as epistemically superior and hence 
remain steadfast.
26 DePoe (2011, pp. 109–110) claims that “many non-Christians have 
rejected Christianity on the grounds that they want to believe that 
they are the ultimate authority of their lives.” This fear of submitting 
to God is a cognitive defect. As examples, he cites Thomas Nagel and 
C. S. Lewis in his pre-Christian state of mind.
27 Thune (2010, p. 720) uses this example when it comes to the Bud-
dhist doctrine of ‘‘dependent origination’’ (which teaches that ‘every-
thing is a stream of mental activity in constant flux’).
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When we look at philosophers who fall into this camp, 
it is unclear which view they hold to. As mentioned above, 
Elga thinks that if one faces wide-ranging disagreement, 
then one has good reason to think one’s disputant is not a 
peer and remain steadfast (2007, pp. 492–496). Similarly, 
Michael Thune argues that since atheists and theists will 
disagree on many religious propositions, both have good 
reasons not to take each other as peers and hence can remain 
steadfast (2010, p. 718). Lastly, David Christensen also 
seems to endorse this. Christensen considers the following 
skeptical principle: “Insofar as the dispute-independent eval-
uation fails to give me good reason for confidence that I’m 
better informed, or more likely to have reasoned from the 
evidence correctly, I must revise my belief in the direction 
of the other person’s” (Christensen 2011, p. 15). This skepti-
cal principle calls for skepticism as long as one has no good 
reason to privilege oneself, even if one lacks good reason 
to take another as a peer. Christensen thinks that we should 
reject this skeptical principle. Why think this? One reason is 
that the skeptical principle will lead to wholesale skepticism 
(Christensen 2011, pp. 15–16). Suppose you meet a global 
skeptic who disagrees with all your beliefs. Here, you would 
have no independent reason to take yourself as epistemi-
cally superior. If the skeptical principle were true, this would 
mean that you have to be skeptical of all your beliefs. But 
it is clear that meeting a global skeptic should not lead to 
wholesale skepticism. Hence, the skeptical principle should 
be rejected (Christensen 2011, pp. 15–16).
In contrast, the second camp calls for skepticism, endors-
ing some version of Christensen’s skeptical principle. Once 
again, there are a few views that can fall under this camp.
S1 In cases of unconfirmed peer disagreement, we should 
not take ourselves as epistemically superior, inferior or as 
peers, and we should conciliate.
S2 In cases of unconfirmed peer disagreement, we should 
just take ourselves as epistemic peers and hence conciliate.
John Pittard seems to be favorable to S1 (2014, p. 94). He 
however thinks that this is no threat to religious belief as he 
allows one to use partisan reasons to privilege oneself. Rob-
ert Mark Simpson seems to hold to S2. He says, “If I have no 
non-question-begging way to appraise the relative epistemic 
credentials of me and my opponent in relation to the subject 
at hand, and if [conciliationism] is correct, then I should bite 
the bullet and revise my beliefs about this subject towards 
the middle ground” (2013, p. 576). So Simpson seems to 
think that when we are unsure who is epistemically supe-
rior, we should take each other as peers and then skepticism 
should arise as in peer disagreement (2013, pp. 575–576).
S2 transforms cases of unconfirmed peer disagree-
ment into cases of peer disagreement and then applies 
conciliationism to the case. Note that one might agree that 
we should take ourselves as peers but argue that we should 
not conciliate. A number of philosophers seem to hold to 
S2 but they are divided on what counts as a good reason to 
privilege oneself. For example, Richard Feldman seems to 
think that there must be agreement of who is epistemically 
superior in order to count as a good reason. He says: “If 
the atheists or the theists … have any reasons for thinking 
that they themselves, rather than those on the other side, 
are the cognitive superiors in this case, then they can iden-
tify and discuss those reasons. And the result will be that 
the evidence shows that all should agree about who the 
experts are or the evidence will show that there is no good 
basis for determining who the experts are” (2007, p. 210).
Sherman calls Feldman’s view “The Presumption of 
Peerhood: when we know of disagreement, we should pre-
sume others are our epistemic peers, until we find mutu-
ally recognizable evidence of epistemic superiority on one 
side or the other” (2015, p. 430). In short, this view says 
that when we lack agreement on our epistemic positions, 
then we should take our disputant as a peer. In contrast, 
Sherman’s Earn-a-Spine view differs in allowing one to 
take oneself as epistemically superior if one has justifiable 
reason to do so, even if it is not mutually recognizable 
(2015, pp. 431–432).
What should we make of these views? Let’s start with 
SF2. First, I think it is odd to take oneself as superior since 
one lacks reason to take oneself as superior. If we lack good 
reason to believe X, we ought not to believe X. Defenders of 
such a view might appeal to self-trust. This however does not 
give me reason to believe that I am in an epistemically supe-
rior position than my disputant. Trusting oneself does not 
mean that one can trust oneself more than another person. 
Defenders may instead appeal to the value of avoiding skep-
ticism. While I agree with avoiding skepticism, this does not 
justify taking oneself as epistemically superior. It is unclear 
how the threat of skepticism gives me reason to believe that 
I am epistemically superior. One can embrace SF1 to avoid 
skepticism. So SF2 should be rejected.
Now consider S2. First, it is odd to assign peerhood 
when one lacks reason to take one’s disputant as a peer. 
Once again, if we lack good reason to believe X, we ought 
not to believe X. One may object here and argue that we 
should take others as peers because humans are cognitively 
similar. Hence, we should trust others as much as we trust 
ourselves. This objection however has difficulties. Eliza-
beth Fricker argues there are asymmetries between people 
over time. She says that although “normal humans all have 
similar basic cognitive equipment,” their reliability differs 
depending on “how they train it and subsequently employ it” 
(Fricker 2014, p. 190). Furthermore, in the case of religious 
disagreements, given the error theories and different reli-
gious epistemological views, it is easy to see that disputants 
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are not cognitively similar. There is significant epistemic 
asymmetry. So S2 should be rejected.
Lastly, both SF2 and S2 lack intuitive support. When you 
first meet a stranger, you lack reason to take him as supe-
rior, inferior or a peer. Should you then just take yourself as 
superior or as a peer? Intuitively, it seems not. If I lack the 
reasons, I should just remain agnostic about it.
The main point I want to highlight in this section is that 
one should remain agnostic about one’s epistemic position 
relative to a disputant when one lacks reasons to do other-
wise. There might be grounds for conciliating or remain-
ing steadfast apart from the presumption that others are our 
peers or inferiors or superiors. This is where I think SF1 
and S1 go right. Due to lack of space I will not pursue SF1 
and S1, but in the next section I defend a principle similar 
to SF1.
6  Steadfastness in Unconfirmed Superiority 
Disagreements
To recap, I have argued that many religious disagreements 
are neither peer disagreements, nor unconfirmed peer disa-
greements, nor disagreements in which we are justified in 
taking ourselves as superior. As argued above in Sect. 4, due 
to the epistemic asymmetry, we have good reason to think 
that we are not peers and that one of us is superior, though 
we lack good reason indicating who it is. Hence, these reli-
gious disagreements are cases of unconfirmed superiority 
disagreements.
In Sect. 5, I had argued that if we cannot tell how our 
disputant compares to us epistemically, then we should just 
be agnostic about our disputant’s epistemic position relative 
to ours. What then is the epistemic significance of religious 
disagreements? If I have theistic experiences that provide 
prima facie justification for my theistic beliefs, can religious 
disagreement act as a defeater for the justification? Should 
such disagreement cause significant doubt? I think not. Simi-
lar to SF1, I want to argue for
SF3 In cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, we 
should not take ourselves as epistemically superior, inferior 
or as peers, and we should remain relatively steadfast.
By “relatively steadfast,” I mean that one should still per-
sist in one’s belief, though a bit of reduction of confidence 
might be called for. In other words, one’s credence should 
be slightly lowered.
In cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, all I 
know is that my disputant is possibly epistemically superior 
(and possibly inferior). It is hard to see how this would give 
me reason to significant doubt myself. If I knew my dispu-
tant was actually epistemically superior, this would call for 
significant doubt. But knowing that my disputant is possibly 
epistemically superior only tells me that there might pos-
sibly be reason to doubt, not that there actually is reason to 
doubt.28
Consider the following case. Suppose you and a stranger 
are taking a math test. The teacher says that one of you is 
smarter. Now, you have reason to doubt the stranger is a 
peer, yet it is unclear who is epistemically superior. During 
an exam you calculate that the answer to the math question 
is 50. You accidentally see that the stranger wrote 40. Since 
one of you is epistemically superior but you lack reason 
indicating who it is, this is a case of unconfirmed superior-
ity disagreement. Intuitively, it does not seem that this calls 
for significant doubt or skepticism. It is only a possibility 
that the stranger is epistemically superior. One may turn to 
a more familiar case. Imagine I have the experience of see-
ing a tree. My friend then tells me that there might possibly 
be evidence that I am a brain in a vat and the tree does not 
really exist. Does this call for significant doubt? It seems not. 
All I know is that it is just a mere possibility. Until he gives 
evidence to suggest that this is actually the case, the brain 
in a vat story does not do much and remains a possibility. 
Likewise, until we have reason to think that the disputant 
is actually superior, the disagreement does not do much. 
Now I do want to note that it is intuitive to think that the 
above cases call for a bit of reduction in credence as they 
alert us to the possibility of being wrong. This is why we 
should remain relatively steadfast in unconfirmed superiority 
disagreements.
One might not share such intuitions or one might not find 
this line of thought convincing. One might think that know-
ing that a disputant is possibly epistemically superior is suf-
ficient to call for significant doubt. Even if I grant this, it 
does not follow that unconfirmed superiority disagreements 
should cause us to significantly doubt ourselves. If knowing 
that a disputant is possibly epistemically superior is relevant, 
then so is knowing that a disputant is possibly epistemically 
inferior. Knowing that a disputant is possibly epistemically 
inferior would give me reason not to doubt despite the disa-
greement. So, I would end up having reason to doubt and 
reason not to doubt. These reasons would cancel each other 
out. Hence, in cases of unconfirmed superiority disagree-
ments, we should remain relatively steadfast.
28 One reviewer raises an objection here. Since there is a possibil-
ity that the person is an epistemic superior, I should be uncertain 
whether I should doubt. If I am uncertain whether I should doubt, 
then I should doubt. In reply, I do not see why this is so. Given that I 
believe a proposition and have reasons for my belief, and I am uncer-
tain whether there are good reasons to doubt, it does not seem that I 
should end up in doubt.
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7  Conclusion
Some philosophers think that religious disagreements call 
for religious skepticism or for us to revise our religious 
beliefs significantly. I think this is wrong in many cases of 
religious disagreements. I have argued for two standards 
of assessing whether or not disputants are peers. Apply-
ing these to some cases of religious disagreements, we can 
have good reasons to think disputants are not peers. Yet, 
we cannot simply take ourselves as superior. It is an open 
question whether we are epistemically superior or inferior 
compared to our disputant. This is hence a case of uncon-
firmed superiority. Sadly, philosophers working on the epis-
temology of disagreement have paid little attention to such 
cases. I argued that in such cases, the disagreement does 
not call for significant doubt, allowing parties to be justified 
in remaining relatively steadfast in holding to their belief. 
Hence, such cases of religious disagreements do not call for 
religious skepticism or for us to revise our religious beliefs 
significantly.
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